This notwithstanding, I will offer an alternative way to cope with terrorism, using George F. Kennan's concept 4 of containment. 5 I believe that Kennan detected the essence of the threat that Soviet communism posed to the U.S. and to Europe after the Second World War: "It is the shadows […] that move the hearts." 6 By this he meant that not the Russian military capabilities and their alleged intention to go to war whatever the cost posed an eminent and threat to the free world, but the possibility of a conversion of the young post-war governments to (Soviet) communism. Kennan was one of the first to realize that in the aftermath of the Second World War the U.S. and USSR fought a battle for "the loyalties and convictions of hundreds of millions of people." 7 The aim of his containment strategy was not to block Soviet communism by military force but by psychology: to reawaken the self-confidence of the European peoples. 8 And the major means to do so was the Marshall Plan: targeting the economic reconstruction of Europe and Russia, 9 not the military rearmament of a potential ally, i.e. the European states, against the USSR.
10
This is the link to our effort to effectively fight the terrorist threat: it is a battle too for the loyalties and convictions of people. Usama bin Ladin is not the problem; given the growing threat perception of an Islamic motivated international terrorism, he is just a complication. The problem is a growing willingness to engage in terrorist attacks-even by apparently well integrated and secularly educated immigrants' children of the second generation, as Olivier Roy puts it:
Britain has been astonished to discover that the terrorists responsible for the London bombings on 7 July were British citizens, born there and apparently well integrated. One was even a convert to Islam. Yet that fits the profile of most of the second generation of al-Qa'ida terrorists that emerged at the end of the 1990s. Most of those active internationally have a westernised background; they were born in Europe or moved there to study or work. All had a secular upbringing. None were educated in madrassas (religious schools), except for brief periods in the case of the 7 July suicide bombers. In fact they went to ordinary state schools and pursued modern studies. Moreover almost all of them became born-again Muslims in the West.
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The convictions of people constitute the strength of a social movement. And besides its horrific violent aspects, terrorism is a social movement intended to achieve social or political change. Without broad support, terrorism loses its potential.
Terrorism's Weakness: Dependence on Support
Basically, terrorism is political and anti-statist in its nature.
12 This description entails an explanation why terrorism obviously always means the use or at least threat of horrible violence. 13 Terrorism is a strategy of "relatively weak groups," 14 which for different reasons (seemingly or effectively) lack the possibility to reach their aims by other means. Terrorist groups are based on radical ideas or ideologies that question the established social order. Their claims are by definition inconsistent with the social systems they are arrayed against. The claim of ending the apartheid in South Africa was absolutely inconsistent with the existence of the South African apartheid system as such; the aim of transforming the German economic-political system into a communist one is absolutely inconsistent with the German Grundgesetz that codifies the German political basic order as free and democratic, and the economic order as a market, i.e. capitalist economy. The desire-legitimate (like in the case of ANC) or not-to implement the particular sociopolitical convictions, 15 even if there is no legal or regular possibility to do so, is one of the reasons for the emergence of terrorism. Whether these terrorist organizations become an eminent threat to a society or a social order depends on the dimension of support the organization can win.
In order to reach a political aim, public support is required (no matter if it is voluntary or enforced). That is why terrorist attacks need to draw great attention and move the people within the political system, against which 27 they turn, to really support their aim. By means of terror, people (members of a government or eligible voters) 16 are to be forced to behave in a certain way, to make certain decisions. And the more terrible the attack, the more devastating the violence, the greater the public attention and the greater the change for the terrorist organization to reach its desired (public) effect: "Do X (for example: change your policy concerning country Y), otherwise we won't stop the attacks against your Zs (for example: citizens)!" 17 Therefore terroristic violence always appears to be indiscriminate violence. It is "directed at persons who are threatened not on their own accounts, but with a view to influencing further persons, in particular those with power, official or otherwise, to affect the political arrangements."
18 This is a "communication strategy:" 19 violence is not an end in itself, but "a kind of a signal, to communicate something to a multitude of men." 20 The bigger the support an organization enjoys, the bigger its capability to threaten a society. Of major importance here is that terrorist groups depend on broad support-sympathy, money, or volunteers, sometimes from sympathizing states, that too provide money, weapons, and training facilities and safe havens and give the claims of the terrorist group a voice on the international stage it otherwise lacks.
Terrorist groups have to operate "underground," given that non-state violence is prima facie illegitimate violence. 21 Activities planned in and carried out underground are demanding: they need and consume a lot of rare resources, like time, money, goods and manpower; and most of all, they are dangerous. These activities are constantly in danger of being discovered-and therefore disrupted. Therefore, as an underground organization, terrorist groups are in a situation of permanent scarcity, but have no secured and reliable access to the resources they need; they cannot, for example, advertise for the "job" of an assassin or a bomb engineer, establish regular trade relations to gather weapons and technology they need, or withdraw into a safe area. 22 All of this-and here we have come full circle-depends heavily on supporters (people and states) that provide it.
A prime example for the crucial dependency of terrorism on broad support is the so-called "German Autumn" caused by the Red Army Faction (RAF) in 1977. 23 The RAF perceived itself as a social revolutionary organization that aimed to change firstly the political economical order in West Germany and secondly in Western Europe to a communist social order. The means the RAF used were terror, kidnapping and arbitrary killing of officials of the political-economic establishment and bombings against German society. Even if the RAF regarded the officials of the system as potential and, from their point of view, legitimate targets, the organiza-Journal of Strategic Security 28 tion carefully paid attention not to harm any member of the proletariat. 24 As some workers were injured by a series of bomb attacks on the Axel Springer publishing house, the RAF not only blamed the capital, i.e. the associates of the publishing house for not clearing the building after getting several hints by phone, 25 but emphatically apologized for doing so. 26 The reason for this is simple enough: the RAF considered the proletariat or the workers in Germany as the audience of its message, i.e. as allies in its fight to change the system. The bombings, kidnappings and killings were just tactical instruments to provoke the state to exaggerated reactions and, by doing so, to alienate the workers from the state and initiate a proletarian rebellion:
That is the dialectic of anti-imperialist combat: that through the […] reaction of the system, the escalation of the counter-revolution, the transformation of the political state of emergency into a military state of emergency, the enemy becomes apparent […] and, by the means of its own terror, alienates the crowd, intensifies the antagonism, to necessitate the revolutionary battle. 27 The problem was: the RAF received no support from the German workers. There were only isolated sympathizers but no broad, no reliable support from the middle of the society. Even the fact that the German Democratic Republic supported the RAF's self-proclaimed revolutionary fight against the "class enemy" in the West 28 could not alter the factual insignificance of the RAF. But measured by its own aims, to initiate a revolution in Germany that would literally set fire to the whole of Western Europe, the RAF totally failed. Conversely, German society demonstrated its stability.
Fighting Fire with Fire?
After 9/11 the U.S. declared a "war on terrorism" toppling the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, established special interrogation centers not only at Guantanamo Bay but also in Iraq and Afghanistan, and spent an enormous amount of money on defense and anti-terror measures:
29 President Bush's defense budget request of $481.4 billion-an 11 percent boost over last year-pushes U.S. defense spending to levels not seen since the Reagan-era buildup of the 1980s. In addition, the president is seeking a projected $141. 29 To test the appropriateness of the instruments of the "war on terrorism" we only have to ask one simple question: Has the world become more secure? Obviously not. The Taliban recaptured parts of Afghanistan, Iraq turned into an open training and recruiting center for "offspring" terrorists, and-this is most fatal-we have to ascertain a growing willingness to engage in anti-Western terrorism.
Even so, the RAF failed with its concept to mobilize the mass of workers, the underlying strategy was right (from the viewpoint of the terrorist organization): to use the harsh and maybe excessive state reaction as evidence for the legitimacy of its actions and a trigger for growing support and-in the case of the RAF-revolution. Unlike the RAF, several terrorist organizations are able to benefit from the vicious circle of violence and counter-violence. This is true for so differing organizations and groups like the ANC, FLN, Hizbollah 30 or al-Qa'ida. Besides the differences, that cover motivations as well as aims, means and (il)legitimacy, 31 they have in common that they gained and, in the cases of Hizbollah and al-Qa'ida, still gain broad support from the state reaction.
The same applies to the Islamic terrorism we currently perceive as the biggest threat. The 2006 Lebanon War ended with a political defeat of Israel, 32 or, as Zaid Al-Ali expounds on opendemocracy.net "Hizbollah has already won." 33 It succeeded in defending Lebanese territory and itself in spite of Israel's massive military efforts. However, most of all, Hizbollah won because Israel's attacks killed hundreds of civilians that not only increased public support for it but also helped Hizbollah recruit new fighters. Of importance here is not the question of which side legitimately fought the war, but which side can use the emotional effects-the pictures of destruction and of dead bodies-for its purposes. 34 A terrorist organization can gain broad support, whether the idea or ideology it stands for (or it claims to stand for) responds to an important need the addressees have. The German workers felt no need to be liberated by the RAF from the "lodger of capitalism." 35 But bin Ladin obviously responds to a-and this is really alarming-growing feeling of discrimina-tion in the Muslim world. A feeling that is inter alia fed by the Palestine conflict. Palestine is part of the collective consciousness of the Muslim world; part of it is propaganda, part is hypocrisy. That notwithstanding, the Palestinian conflict is proof of a biased international system: of a political disaster that left hundred of thousands of people strandedhopelessly and impecuniously, compliant victims to organizations that offer money and a better life-and has remained unsolved for decades.
A second example, that also circulates through the Muslim world as evidence not only for a biased international order but as brutal discrimination of Muslims, is the UN sanctions imposed on Saddam Hussein's Iraq, beginning in 1990 and continued until the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The sanctions were imposed on the regime following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, banning financial resources and all trade except for medicine 36 and, in some circumstances, food. Under U.S. President Ronald Reagan, the sanctions were initially intended to bring about a change of system in Iraq, but later, under U.S. President Bill Clinton, only the complete disclosure of the Iraqi weapons program was settled for. The dimension of the humanitarian cataclysm is dubious to date. Estimates of direct casualties of the sanctions reach up to "One million Iraqis, mostly children." 37 The sanctions made people suffer for a regime and its politics they were obviously not responsible for; Saddam's Iraq was a dictatorship characterized by the powerlessness of the subject. Second, the U.S. and Europe armed Saddam's regime, providing him with weapons and technology to fight the so-called mullah-regime in Iran. 38 It is examples like this, together with references to current coercive measures, applied in the "war on terrorism," that enable Usama bin Ladin not only to justify al-Qa'ida's assaults, but also to construct the threat of Western crusade against Islam as a whole. In an interview, recorded by al Jazeera on 20th October 2001, the second week of the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan, bin Ladin made connections between the sanctions on Iraq, the war in Afghanistan and a new crusade: "What about the people that have been killed in our lands for decades? More than 1,000,000 children died in Iraq, and they are still dying […] this is a war which, like previous wars, is reviving the Crusades." 39 
Containment Revived
We seriously have to take into consideration that Muslims all over the world are sharing a growing feeling of insecurity, of threat, of inferiority. To fight terrorism, we have to concentrate on helping people lose their insecurity and angst, and get back their self-esteem. Maybe that sounds a little bit esoteric and as much inappropriate as possible to formulate concrete politics. But this was, as John Lewis Gaddis notes, the underlying notion of Kennan's strategy of containment:
More serious [than a Russian war to conquer Europe and Japan, A.B.] was the possibility of conquest by psychological means: the danger that the people of Western Europe and Japan […] might become so demoralized by the combined dislocations of war and reconstruction as to make themselves vulnerable, through sheer lack of self-confidence, to communist-led coups, or even to communist victories in free elections. 40 Communism enjoyed broad support after the Second World War, given that it was largely communists who organized the resistance against Hitler and Nazi-Germany. 41 Similarly, Islam, i.e., its radical interpretation, is perceived as an answer and a solution: it creates a feeling of belonging, it is an explanation for the perceived felt discrimination, and it provides a justification for confrontation. The last point is decisive: radical Islam vitally needs the enmity of the Western World, no matter whether it is real or just propaganda; that exactly correlates with Kennan's assessment of Soviet communism. In his famous "Long Telegram," he analyzed that Soviet communism is dependent on the enmity of the Western World. It is a legitimation "for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifice they felt bound to demand." 42 Kennan's strategy of containment was based upon two pillars. First, European economic rehabilitation: "This would have the advantage…of removing or at least mitigating the conditions that had made indigenous communism popular there in the first place." 43 And second, the conviction that might does not make right, or, as Kennan told students at the Naval Academy in May 1947: "Our country has made the greatest effort in modern times…to treat questions of international life from the standpoint of principles and not of power." 44 The former would help to restore self esteem of the European people, the latter to decrease mistrust and insecurity: "The United States…must demonstrate by its own self-confidence and patience, but particularly by the integrity and dignity of its example, that the true glory of Russian national effort can find its expression only in peaceful and friendly association with other peoples and not in attempts to subjugate and dominate those peoples." 45 Both pillars may serve as guidelines for anti-terrorism policies that endeavor to delve to the bottom of the problem, instead of dealing only with the symptoms. This strategy can only function in the long term. The movie "Charlie Wilson's War" is a true depiction of U.S. support for the finally successful mujahidin resistance against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. And so it ends, as Charles Wilson writes in the Washington Post, "congressional appropriators turn down my request for funds to rebuild Afghanistan's schools, roads and economy." 46 For the rehabilitation of a whole country, a million dollars was too much; however, not so one billion dollars for financing a war. Of course, the reality is not as simple as that: a stronger Western engagement in the buildup of Afghanistan would have avoided the rise of the Taliban. But, as the success of Hizbollah teaches us, gaps will be filled. And, yes, it makes a difference, whether I teach children in an open and free educational institution or in madrassas (religious schools), that are aimed at indoctrination. With a simple effect: once accepted social habits and socially embedded convictions are very hard to question or change.
During the European economic rehabilitation, the U.S. focused on aid and not on arms, as Secretary of Defense James Forrestal explained:
At the present time we are keeping our military expenditures below the levels which our military leaders must in good conscience estimate as the minimum which would in themselves ensure national security. By so doing we are able to increase our expenditures to assist in European recovery. In other words, we are taking a calculated risk in order to follow a course which offers a prospect of eventually achieving national security and also long-term world stability. 47 In times of the "war on terrorism," the signs have changed and "America's civilian institutions of diplomacy and development continue to be chronically undermanned and underfunded. We spend 1 percent of the federal budget on these critical elements of our foreign policy, compared with 22 percent on the military and weapons." 48 This shift of emphasis leads to the second pillar: that might does not make right. Economic wealth, combined with social development, is a premise of a people's self-esteem; but it must be accompanied by an international environment that is not discriminating. Discrimination is a kind of social exclusion that causes the desire of belonging. And Islamic groups respond to this desire, intensifying the opposition: We versus Them.
In practical terms: our international order must become subject to principle, not power, i.e. that rules and norms are binding on every state, the weak as well as the mighty. The Hobbesian "might makes right" creates only insecurity, given firstly that power is never absolute, but always rela-33 tive. "For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself." 49 Our world must become more just. As long as we have unsolved hot spots like the Palestine conflict, or a biased implementation of international treaties, as long as one part of the world can easily make an legal decision that costs thousands of innocent lives and as long as the place of birth determines one's lifespan and prospects, 50 there will always be new supporters and followers for terrorists like Usama bin Ladin. We need to meet an American-European task: more economic development and an international order that is ruled by principle, not by power.
